Category: Assurance

  • ia awareness training

    Information Assurance Awareness Training


    NIST Special Publication 800-50, is a regulation dedicated to IA Awareness Training



    NIST SP 800-5, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness & Training Program


    The 800-50 includes guidance on development and sustainment of an awareness & training IT Security (aka information assurance training) program for all users, employees and supervisors within an organization. Having a training program is mandated by the Federal Information Security Act of 2002.

    IA Awareness Training – Roles & Responsibilities

    Agency heads – must ensure that high priority is given to effective security awareness and training for employees. Appoint a CIO
    CIO – Establish overall strategy, funding, tracking and report is in place for the IT security awareness and training program
    IT Security Program Manager – tactical deployment, development and maintenance of the IT security & awareness program.
    Managers – responsible for complying with IT security awareness program. Work with CIO and IT Security Program Managers to share responsibility. Ensure all users are trained to fulfill their security roles before access is giving. Promote professional development and certification of the IT staff.
    Users – largest audience in any organization and are the single most important group of people who can help to reduce unintentional errors.


    800-50 calls learning a “continuum”. The continuum of learning starts awareness and builds into education.
    Awareness – awareness is not training. Awareness focuses on security concerns to ensure users are mindful of basic rules and issues in a given environment.


    Awareness is not training. The purpose of awareness presentations is simply to focus attention on security. Awareness presentations are intended to allow individuals to recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly. – 800-50

    Training – is a formal focused method to develop a skill for job performance.
    Training strives to produce relevant and needed security skills and competencies – 800-50


    Education – combines multidisciplinary areas into a common body of knowledge.



    Education integrates all of the security skills and competencies of the various functional specialties into a common body of knowledge . . . and strives to produce IT security specialists and professionals capable of vision and pro-active response. –800-50

  • Training & Certification: Risk Management Approach to Security Authorization

    Understand the Risk Management Approach to Security Authorization

    The concept of management of information security risks across an enterprise is discussed in 800-39. An organization takes a multitier approach to the risk management at the organizational, mission, and system levels. Risk management framework is a process that is broken down in NIST 800-37, Risk Management Framework. The CAP addresses the following:

      Distinguish between applying risk management principles and satisfying compliance requirements
      Identify and maintain information systems inventory
      Understand the criticality of securing information
      Understand organizational operations

    Distinguish between applying risk management principles and satisfying compliance
    Risk management includes satisfying compliance. Even though some controls may not be able to be made fully compliant due to limited resources, residual risk to the organization can still be mitigated and managed. – Concepts of NIST SP 800-37, Guide of RMF

    Identifying and maintaining information system (IS) inventory is addressed in NIST 800-37, Risk Management Framework, 800-18, System Security Plan & 800-64, System Development Life Cycle. 800-37 addresses inventory of the IS in RMF Step 1 – Categorization of IS. Of the tasks of categorization includes information system registration which begins with by identifying the information system in the system inventory. This is documented in the security plan. NIST SP 800-18 discusses how the inventory is documents, and logically separates the system authorization boundary. That inventory is maintained and monitored throughout the life cycle of the IS (from imitation to disposal and from categorization to monitoring of the system).

    A CAP candidate can understand the criticality of security information from reading FIPS 199, categorization of federal information systems.

    Understanding the organizational operations of the system is imperative to a CAP candidate for the purpose of scope guidance described in NIST SP 800-53.

  • Risk Management in IT: NSS

    Risk Management of IT: National Security Systems

    Risk Assessments and Risk Management will apply to National Security Systems (NSS).

    What is a Risk Assessment?

    A risk assessment is the results/process to determine the likelihood that a threat will exploit a weakness. Risk assessment is a part of the risk management.

    What is risk management?

    Risk Management is the on-going process of determining assessing, identifying and prioritizing of risks.

    Is My System a National Security System?

    NIST SP 800-59, Guidance for Identifying an information system as an NSS. 800-39 is a 17 page document developed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency, for identifying an information system as a national security system. It is basised on the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).

    Who determines if you have an NSS?

    The head of each agency is responsible for designating an agency information security official to determine which, if any, agency systems are national security systems.

    Tools to determine if you have a NSS system:

    National Security System Identification Checklist (NIST SP 800-59, Appendix A). The NSS ID Checklist asks (6) questions. Answering yes to any of these questions qualifies your system as an NSS:
    • Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve intelligence activities?
    • Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve cryptologic activities related to national security?
    • Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve command and control of military forces?
    • Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system?
    • Is the system critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions?
    • Does the system store, process, or communicate classified information?

    NSS RMF
    The guidance of CNSSI 1253 is the result of NIST collaborated with the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) to ensure NIST SP 800-53 contains security controls to meet the requirements of National Security Systems (NSS).

    KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CNSS INSTRUCTION NO. 1253 AND NIST PUBLICATIONS

    The key differences between CNSSI 1253 and the rest of the NIST publications is that NSS systems do not follow “high-water mark”, NSS maybe tailored through risk-based adjustment, control profiles, and a method that allows organization to practice reciprocity.

    NSS and High Water Mark
    Both FIPS 200 and NIST 800-53 apply the concept of a high-water mark (HWM) when categorizing information systems according to the worst-case potential impact of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an information system. This Instruction does not adopt this HWM usage. In the National Security Community, the potential impact levels determined for confidentiality, integrity, and availability are retained, meaning there are 27 possible three-value combinations for NSI or NSS, as opposed to the three possible single-value categorizations obtained using the guidelines in FIPS 200. – CNSSI 1253

    Risk-Based Adjustment
    Potential impact-based security categorizations for NSS may be tailored through the use of a risk-based adjustment. This adjustment takes into consideration the physical and personnel security measures already employed throughout the National Security Community and factors such as aggregation of information.

    Control Profile
    Method by which organizations may designate sets of controls for NSS based on their enterprise-wide risk assessment and taking into account business objectives, system risks, and mission needs.

    NSS Reciprocity
    It is the policy of the National Security Community that member organizations practice reciprocity with respect to the certification of systems and system components to the greatest extent practicable. Reciprocity of certification reduces the cost and time to implement systems and system components.

  • DIARMF

    Department of Defense Information Assurance Risk Management Framework (DIARMF) will replace the DoD’s DIACAP process. As of Mar 2011 it is still being developed. The former DoD Information Assurance Certification & Accreditation Process (DIACAP) will undergo the same change as the NIST SP 800-37, C&A guide did when it changed to the rev 1, Guide for Applying Risk Management Framework. Some of the changes from DIACAP to DIARMF will consist of:

      NIST SP 800-53 controls
      Change focus from C&A to Risk Management
      Definition of how to bridge between DoD systems and NIST defined system (subsystems & Platform IT for example)
      DIARMF will look more like NIST 800-37 rev 1

    It is unknown how DIARMF authorization packages will look. Currently, the DIACAP consist of DIACAP packages (DIP, SIP, scorecard, POA&M with artifacts) and NIST 800-37 rev 1 consists of a Security Authorization Package (System Security Plan, Security Assessment Report & POA&M). Also, the roles between the NIST Risk Management Framework and the DoD 8500 series are different. So far, the DON CIO and ASD (NII) have come up with mapping between the roles and the 800-53 controls.

    The DIARMF will hopefully cover all of the gaps between the DoD C&A process and the new NIST 800-37, Risk Management Framework.

  • DoD Risk Management FrameWork (Part 1): Look Ahead


    The DoD is working on using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Certification & Accreditation method of assessing & authorizing systems. The NIST system of C&A is actually known as Risk Management Framework (RMF). This would require the the Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks & Information Integration ASD(NII) office to move the DoDI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) controls to be mapped to the NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls. I am not certain yet whether they will eliminate the 8500.2 or just have all departments move to the NIST SP 800-53. They will also need to switch the DoD Information Assurance Certification & Accreditation Process (DIACAP) to the NIST SP 800-37 rev 1, Risk Management Framework or something similar.

    If the transition is anything like their move to from DoD Information Technology Security Certification & Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) to the DIACAP then they will give about 2 years for the DoD to transition. As of Mar. 2011, there is no policy on this. It is serious because its on the DIACAP KS and the Department of Navy CIO has been releasing information on it since 2009. The DON CIO & the ASD (NII) have been working on the project to transition from DIACAP to some sort of DoD Risk Management Framework. So far, they have mapped the DoDI 8500.2 IA controls to the NIST SP 800-53 Controls: Certification and Accreditation Transformation: Security Control Mapping. Here is a May 2010 update to the NIST to DIACAP mapping. 800-53 to DoD IA contols map also includes the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3 controls. This is very telling. The plan seems to be to have one standard for all Federal Information System.

    Since DoD 8510.01, DIACAP & NIST SP 800-37, Risk Management Framework (RMF) cover so much of the same ground, I think the only real benefit is that reciprocity between Federal agency will be easier if all departments have one standard of risk management and one security control set.

    The DON uses the certification and accreditation (C&A) process to assess and understand the residual risk associated with operating information systems (IS) and information technology (IT). The DON is participating with the DoD, the IC, and the rest of the Federal government in C&A transformation. One goal of transformation is to achieve common security controls enabling the DON, the DoD, the IC, and the rest of the Federal government to develop systems to the same protection standards.

    The recently released National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, revision 3 provides recommended consolidated security controls in an effort to achieve common security controls across the Federal government.

    The DON will continue to use the DoDI 8500.2 as the authoritative source for security controls until otherwise specified. However, understanding the changes represented in NIST SP 800-53r3 will be essential as DoD and the DON begin transitioning to this new set of security controls. To support the transition, the DON CIO developed this security control mapping document to demonstrate how existing DoD and IC security controls map to the security controls recommended by the NIST SP 800-53r3 publication.

    Security Control Mapping Document Aids Transition, DON CIO Site

  • When does a DoD Information System require a re-accreditation

    How do you determine when a DoD Information System should have a full re-accreditation?

    We are not talking about the obvious:
    -3 year expiration
    -completely new version and/or overhaul of a system

    We are talking about a single client on within an Information System getting an upgraded operating systems, or a firewall being upgraded or the addition of 4 Cisco internetworking devices and a VLAN change.

    How do we know what is a basic sustaiment change, a configuration management changed (approved by the Configuration Board members) or a full blown 100,000 dollar re-accreditation.

    You would think there was some kind of matrix that could match up modifications to a DoD IS with what actions must be performed. If there is one, I have not seen it.

    All we have is high level regs that tell us IA Workforce peons (who must deal with details, schedules and limited funds) almost nothing we don’t already know.

    Assessing the IA Impact & Maintaining Situational Awareness:
    DoD 8500.2, Information Assurance gives us IA Controls such as
    DCII-1, dealing with IA Impact Assessment. Its states, “Changes to the DoD information system are assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to implementation.” The DoD instruction also tells us the we are supposed conduct comprehensive annual reviews of our systems process, procedures and IA Control status.

    How are we supposed to monitor “Changes to the DoD information system?

    We know that we are supposed monitor all DoD IS’s to keep track of the baseline. And according to the regs, we are supposed to do this by a configuration management process (DCPR-1, CM Process). That configuration management process is supposed to have a “configuration control board that implements procedures to ensure a security review and approval of all proposed DoD information system changes, to include interconnections to other DoD information systems.”

    So Configuration Management gives us oversight on changes to DoD IS but who within the CM process determines whether changes to a system should have a re-accreditation?
    IA Control DCCB-2, Control Board tells us that” all information systems are under the control of a chartered Configuration Control Board that meets regularly according to DCPR-1.” Is also tells us that the Information Assurance Manager (IAM) is a member of the CCB.

    From my interpretation of these high level statements, the IAM is the subject matter expert who has a lot of say so on the IA impact of modifications to a given DoD IS.

    But the question remains.. HOW DO WE KNOW WHAT NECESSITATES A RE-ACCREDITATION?

    I did not find anything for that in 8500.2 so I moved on to CJCSI 6510.01, but it only says the same things that 8500.2 says (Configuration Management, CCB, having a baseline). But it did say this:

    “Ensure a configuration management (CM) process is implemented and establish appropriate levels of configuration management to maintain the accredited security posture. The security impact of each change or modification to an information system or site configuration will be assessed against the security requirements and the accreditation conditions issued by the DAA..”

    Still pretty high level, but we are getting closer since the instruction is telling us: “..security impact of each change or modification to an information system or site configuration will be assessed against the security requirements and the accreditation conditions issued by the DAA“.

    I thought that the only way to get more insight is to look at the lower level regulations within specific branches. Air Force’s Certification & Accreditation Program, 33-210, for example talks specifically about reaccreditation. It states, Information system owner (ISO) “Alerts AFNetOps of any changes to the topology or software affecting the security posture of the enclave boundaries so that the gateway package can be reaccredited if necessary. (3.8.6.6.4.)” And in table 3.2. it states “PM/SM/ISO will enter information in EITDR, host an initial stakeholder meeting, and initial security review to determine if a new version is to be created.” It mentions different reaccreditation actions for Networked and Standalone systems. Its goes on say that “if changes will not affect the security posture of the IS, the PM/SM/ISO will annotate the outcome of the meeting and make necessary edits to the C&A package.”

    The Army’s AR 25-2, Information Assurance regulation, has an entire section on Accrediation & Reaccreditation (5-5), but offers still no specifics. The Army does have AR 380-19, AIS Information System Security and it is pretty specific (see excerpt below).. but it is now OBSOLETE and replaced by AR 25-5.

    All regulation and instructions are inline as far as the need to reaccredit if there is an IA IMPACT, but no specifics on what constitues an “IA Impact”. 8510, DIACAP mentions that the IA posture of an IS must remain acceptable, in order to retain its Authorization to Operate (ATO). If I were the IAM for a day.. I would hang my hat of this important statement.

    We have to work with what we have!!
    Based on what we have:
    Changes in a DoD IS’s IA Controls determine whether or not a system will need a reaccrediation. There is no specifics on what can force a reaccrediation. So we must conclude that there is no “magic bullet” that will instantly create the need for a reaccreditation. In other words, no modifications to a certain hardware or software or certain subsystems or even the changes to network architecture will be the reason for reaccreditation every single time.

    Significant changes to IA Controls are the only thing we can really put our finger on.

    So lets say that IA Control, DCCS-2, Configuration Specification was changed on an Information System. This IA Control deals with making sure the all IA Enabled and IA Products have the DISA Security Technical Implementation Guides (or equivalent) applied. Maybe an example will help us understand the process of determining reaccreditation: A DoD Information System Owner requests the addition of four new storage devices to the system enclave. Lets say, that these storage devices will have an adverse affect on the security posture of the overall system because they are not in compliance with DCAS-2, Acquisition Standards… so the storage devices have not gone through NSA/Common Criteria. Additionally the storage devices will not be compliant with DCCS which means they will not have security in accordance with DISA/NSA checklists and guidance.

    Prior to being implemented or even tested the request for this change should go through the configuration management process where the IAM will tell the Program Manager and System Owner (or is representative) the security impact to the over all system. He or she would have to explain to them that the change may affect the current ATO, because they will now be non-compliant on two (possibly more controls) that were previously compliant. The IAM would also be wise to get in contact with other subject matter experts such as the system administrator and/or IAO would be in charge of implementing and testing the system. The IAM might also contact the Certifying Authority (or representative) to determine if such a change would create the need for a reaccreditation.

    One thing the IAM does NOT want to do is simply sign the Program Managers and System Owners up for some changes to the system that would jeapordise the Authorization to Operate. The IAM should do their homework and present the real risk of the modifications to the system owner. CYA is paramount.

    Once the IAM determine the impact, and the modification are made:
    According to DoD 8500.2, 5.8.5. “ensure that IA-related events or configuration changes that may impact accreditation are reported to affected parties, such as Information Owners and DAAs of interconnected DoD information systems.”

    Some older regulations are more specific. AR 380-19, AIS System Security for example:
    3-6. Reaccreditation

    a. All AIS, except those designated as nonsensitive, will be formally reaccredited within 3 months after any of the following occurs:

    (1) Addition or replacement of a mainframe or significant part of a major system.

    (2) A change in sensitivity designation (para 2-2a).

    (3) A change in security mode of operation (para 2-2b).

    (4) A significant change to the operating system or executive software.

    (5) A breach of security, violation of system integrity, or unusual situation that appears to invalidate the accreditation.

    (6) A significant change to the physical structure housing the AIS that affects the physical security described in the accreditation.

    (7) Three years has elapsed since the effective date of the existing accreditation.

    b. Reaccreditation will include the same steps accomplished for the original accreditation; however, those portions of the documentation that are still valid need not be redone.

    AR 380-19 has been replaced with AR 25-5 which is pretty high level.

  • SAP security audit programs

    SAP- Increasing Demand by Increasing Efficiency

    Systems, applications, Products (SAP) is a security auditing program that checks a computer systems data integrity and overall security. This application is accompanied by a user interface that is highly flexible. SAP security audit programs were introduced in the 1980s and provides the best audit resources for major companies and industry leaders.

    In SAP, audit security is the foremost requirement enabling access control and separation of duties. These two areas are very important for the integration of control mechanisms. A company must plan prior to implementing SAP to obtain better access and a clear understanding of the system. This includes proper design of profile and removal of surplus IDs. Security audit programs includes many audit procedures that are designed to efficiently access a variety of transactions.

    The main administrative function of SAP security Audit Programs includes automatic scheduling of jobs according to different user IDs, monitoring errors, administering backdrop session and access to proper management functionality. As far as security settings are concerned, SAP system audit program helps to execute online programs using different procedures and maintenance of different tables. This allows access to maintain different profile parameters including password and security of default user IDs. SAP system audit programs also allow locking of sensitive codes of transactions and execution of OS commands externally.

    The SAP system audit program contains different audit procedures showing steps to extract useful information from a system. Some system audit program resources are highly beneficial and include audit programs for financial accounting, audit programs for basic security, audit programs for Fixed Asset, audit programs for expenditures, audit programs for treasury, audit programs for inventory management, audit programs for HR & payroll and audit programs for revenue. Companies using SAP applications can create different software packages to meet their key objectives. This application is assembled in such a way that allows each department of an organization to get integrated.

  • UPDATED IA STUFF + Procrastination

    My greatest skill is procrastination. I really am the best, most skilled procrastinator I know. It takes all of my will power to stay consistent with anything, including this blog, which is why (among other things) I am not banking like Darren Rowse or Steve Pav, two of my favorite bloggers.

    YOU SEE, I am such a good procrastinator that I JUST procrastinated on getting to the REAL subject of this article, security, IA updates.

    A fellow IA Analyst wrote me with questions that got right to the heart of IA… change.

    She asked about AFI 33-202.
    And I said:

    Right as I felt I had mastered the contents of 33-202, the airforce moved to 33-210 (to replace all its C&A stuff). I believe 33-202 is now obsolete and replaced with 33-200 & 33-202 and others.. last time I was with the AF, anyway.

    What about IT LEAN?
    I said:

    As for IT Lean, you can find that on AF Knowledge Now site and I think they have links to it on EITDR. If you are interested in IT Lean you’ll be REALLY interested in 33-210:
    33-210

    But if you are working with the Air Force and want more on the IT LEAN process you should be digging into AFCAP, Air Force Certification & Accreditation Program, an AF version of IT Lean.

    CNSS 1253:
    A lot of people also ask me to send them a copy of the CNSSI 12-53. But it is actually OUT. Its the CNSSI 1253. I, personally, have not had any clear direction (currently NO direction) on how to start moving some of the CNSSI to the systems I work on. I suspect that the Govt. will start this within the next couple of years and start phasing out DIACAP.. but who the hell knows what a bureaucracy of their size will do next!

    Lastly, my fellow IA Analyst asked me about EITDR
    and I said:

    You’ll find the EITDR POCs on the Air Force Portal or Knowledge Now. Log on to the Air Force Portal (if you don’t have an account get one.. you may have to get sponsor by the Govt to get it). Once on the AF Portal search for EITDR and they’ll have tons of stuff on it. Waaaaay more stuff than you want to read. You’ll also find the person you need to start the EITDR process with.

  • SRR Findings to IA Controls

    From Reader:

    I stumbled upon your site and am new to security working for a contractor. I’m attempting to complete a DIACAP POA&M and need to map SRR findings to IA controls – any idea where I might find this information?

    The SRR finding reference the DOD Unix STIG and NIPR STIG. It doesn’t seem to completely match up the the DIACAP IA Controls, but that is where a good system security engineer/ IA analyst comes in.

    Once you’ve got your SRR results, IA Control compliance and mitigation depends on your situation. There are a few that map directly (like Screen Saver) but most of the SRR findings will fall under one or two of the IA Controls.

    Hope this helps.