Risk Management in IT: NSS

Risk Management of IT: National Security Systems

Risk Assessments and Risk Management will apply to National Security Systems (NSS).

What is a Risk Assessment?

A risk assessment is the results/process to determine the likelihood that a threat will exploit a weakness. Risk assessment is a part of the risk management.

What is risk management?

Risk Management is the on-going process of determining assessing, identifying and prioritizing of risks.

Is My System a National Security System?

NIST SP 800-59, Guidance for Identifying an information system as an NSS. 800-39 is a 17 page document developed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, including the National Security Agency, for identifying an information system as a national security system. It is basised on the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).

Who determines if you have an NSS?

The head of each agency is responsible for designating an agency information security official to determine which, if any, agency systems are national security systems.

Tools to determine if you have a NSS system:

National Security System Identification Checklist (NIST SP 800-59, Appendix A). The NSS ID Checklist asks (6) questions. Answering yes to any of these questions qualifies your system as an NSS:
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve intelligence activities?
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve cryptologic activities related to national security?
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve command and control of military forces?
• Does the function, operation, or use of the system involve equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system?
• Is the system critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions?
• Does the system store, process, or communicate classified information?

NSS RMF
The guidance of CNSSI 1253 is the result of NIST collaborated with the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Defense (DoD), and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) to ensure NIST SP 800-53 contains security controls to meet the requirements of National Security Systems (NSS).

KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CNSS INSTRUCTION NO. 1253 AND NIST PUBLICATIONS

The key differences between CNSSI 1253 and the rest of the NIST publications is that NSS systems do not follow “high-water mark”, NSS maybe tailored through risk-based adjustment, control profiles, and a method that allows organization to practice reciprocity.

NSS and High Water Mark
Both FIPS 200 and NIST 800-53 apply the concept of a high-water mark (HWM) when categorizing information systems according to the worst-case potential impact of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an information system. This Instruction does not adopt this HWM usage. In the National Security Community, the potential impact levels determined for confidentiality, integrity, and availability are retained, meaning there are 27 possible three-value combinations for NSI or NSS, as opposed to the three possible single-value categorizations obtained using the guidelines in FIPS 200. – CNSSI 1253

Risk-Based Adjustment
Potential impact-based security categorizations for NSS may be tailored through the use of a risk-based adjustment. This adjustment takes into consideration the physical and personnel security measures already employed throughout the National Security Community and factors such as aggregation of information.

Control Profile
Method by which organizations may designate sets of controls for NSS based on their enterprise-wide risk assessment and taking into account business objectives, system risks, and mission needs.

NSS Reciprocity
It is the policy of the National Security Community that member organizations practice reciprocity with respect to the certification of systems and system components to the greatest extent practicable. Reciprocity of certification reduces the cost and time to implement systems and system components.

DoD Risk Management FrameWork (Part 1): Look Ahead


The DoD is working on using the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Certification & Accreditation method of assessing & authorizing systems. The NIST system of C&A is actually known as Risk Management Framework (RMF). This would require the the Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks & Information Integration ASD(NII) office to move the DoDI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) controls to be mapped to the NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls. I am not certain yet whether they will eliminate the 8500.2 or just have all departments move to the NIST SP 800-53. They will also need to switch the DoD Information Assurance Certification & Accreditation Process (DIACAP) to the NIST SP 800-37 rev 1, Risk Management Framework or something similar.

If the transition is anything like their move to from DoD Information Technology Security Certification & Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) to the DIACAP then they will give about 2 years for the DoD to transition. As of Mar. 2011, there is no policy on this. It is serious because its on the DIACAP KS and the Department of Navy CIO has been releasing information on it since 2009. The DON CIO & the ASD (NII) have been working on the project to transition from DIACAP to some sort of DoD Risk Management Framework. So far, they have mapped the DoDI 8500.2 IA controls to the NIST SP 800-53 Controls: Certification and Accreditation Transformation: Security Control Mapping. Here is a May 2010 update to the NIST to DIACAP mapping. 800-53 to DoD IA contols map also includes the Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3 controls. This is very telling. The plan seems to be to have one standard for all Federal Information System.

Since DoD 8510.01, DIACAP & NIST SP 800-37, Risk Management Framework (RMF) cover so much of the same ground, I think the only real benefit is that reciprocity between Federal agency will be easier if all departments have one standard of risk management and one security control set.

The DON uses the certification and accreditation (C&A) process to assess and understand the residual risk associated with operating information systems (IS) and information technology (IT). The DON is participating with the DoD, the IC, and the rest of the Federal government in C&A transformation. One goal of transformation is to achieve common security controls enabling the DON, the DoD, the IC, and the rest of the Federal government to develop systems to the same protection standards.

The recently released National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, revision 3 provides recommended consolidated security controls in an effort to achieve common security controls across the Federal government.

The DON will continue to use the DoDI 8500.2 as the authoritative source for security controls until otherwise specified. However, understanding the changes represented in NIST SP 800-53r3 will be essential as DoD and the DON begin transitioning to this new set of security controls. To support the transition, the DON CIO developed this security control mapping document to demonstrate how existing DoD and IC security controls map to the security controls recommended by the NIST SP 800-53r3 publication.

Security Control Mapping Document Aids Transition, DON CIO Site

SRR Findings to IA Controls

From Reader:

I stumbled upon your site and am new to security working for a contractor. I’m attempting to complete a DIACAP POA&M and need to map SRR findings to IA controls – any idea where I might find this information?

The SRR finding reference the DOD Unix STIG and NIPR STIG. It doesn’t seem to completely match up the the DIACAP IA Controls, but that is where a good system security engineer/ IA analyst comes in.

Once you’ve got your SRR results, IA Control compliance and mitigation depends on your situation. There are a few that map directly (like Screen Saver) but most of the SRR findings will fall under one or two of the IA Controls.

Hope this helps.

CNSSI 12-53: New Security Control Catalog for National Security Systems

2014 – Update, DIACAP has been upgraded to Risk Management Framework for DoD IT (aka DIARMF).  Its base on the NIST SP 800-37, Risk Management Framework for Federal IT and takes from CNSSI 1253.

Risk Management Framework for DoD IT takes all IA Controls (Security Controls) from NIST SP 800-53.

New DIACAP Certification & Accreditation IA Controls

The DoD has had the same IA controls since DoD 8510.1-M, controls since DoD 8510.1-M, Department of Defense Information Technology System Certification & Accreditation Process (DITSCAP), July 31, 2000 – it was developed late last century.

The DoD has a total of 157 IA controls spread across 8 subject areas in 4 classes:

DC – Security Design & Configuration

IA – Identification and Authentication

EC – Enclave & Computing

EB – Enclave Boundary Defense

PE – Physical & Environmental

PR – Personnel

CO – Continuity

VI – Vulnerability

There is a huge change coming in certification & accreditation for the DoD coming. The IA controls are being expanded and changed. The last two DIACAP classes I’ve been to mentioned that there is a big change coming. Essentially, all the IA Controls (security controls, safeguards, countermeasures.. whatever your organization is calling them) are getting expanded. All federal organizations will have security controls that look more like what is in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53. This is all being placed in the Committee on National Security Systems Instruction (CNSSI) 1253. As of 25 June 2009, the CNSSI 1253 is still in draft.

The draft has 17 families & identifiers in three security control classes.

TABLE 1: SECURITY CONTROL CLASSES, FAMILIES, AND IDENTIFIERS
IDENTIFIER FAMILY CLASS

AC Access Control Technical

AT Awareness and Training Operational

AU Audit and Accountability Technical

CA Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments Management

CM Configuration Management Operational

CP Contingency Planning Operational

IA Identification and Authentication Technical

IR Incident Response Operational

MA Maintenance Operational

MP Media Protection Operational

PE Physical and Environmental Protection Operational

PL Planning Management

PS Personnel Security Operational

RA Risk Assessment Management

SA System and Services Acquisition Management

SC System and Communications Protection Technical

The CNSSI has about 500 controls with pretty good granularity.

One of the really cool thing about 1253 was the security control mapping. It’s a table that matches up 800-53, DCID 6/3 and DODI 8500.2.

DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 4): DIACAP/AFCAP Day 4 & 5

UPDAT: 2014 – Risk Management Framework for DOD IT released.

Days 4 & 5 bring the DIACAP/AFCAP Essentials Class to a close. The
biggest things I learned were: CNSSI 4009 is the the official glossary of DOD IA, there is a big difference between theory, policy and practice, Agents of the Certifying Authority (ACA) are official validators and there is a difference between acquisition Mission criticality and IA MAC levels.

Stuff I learned from people in the class:

-AFCA is changing its name (to what?)

DOD is going to put the new IA controls in NCSSI 12-53 (currently in draft)

-a lot of what I need in there is in NIST 800-53

Marines use something called Exacta

Site called securitycritics.org

33-202 is now completely irrelevant and obsolete (not even mentioned ONCE in the class)

800-30

Feds call Certification &Accreditation (C&A) “Security authorization”

NIST SP 800-37

Day 4:

Validator Activities & Issue Accreditation Decision

Prepare POA&M

Validate Results/Scorecard

Scorecard

Make certification determination

CA/DAA Package review

Day 5:

Validation procedures were discussed. On day five, we looked at how the validators look at a system.

I thought is was interesting. It should help me get through the EITDR/DIACAP process easier.

Maintain Situational Awareness

Maintain IA Posture

Conduct Review

R-Accreditation

Retire system

DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 4): DIACAP/AFCAP Day3

UPDAT: 2014 – Risk Management Framework for DOD IT released.

Day 3 heats up a little. We start talking about what it take to actually get validated. The DIACAP Implementers Guide & the DIACAP Validators guide is opened up and reviewed. I think we all learned a little something during this discussion because there have been some challenges with this. Unfortunately, we don’t to far into the validator stuff.

Day 3:

DIACAP Structure

Terminology Review

Assemble DIACAP Team

Registered System/System Information Profile

Assign IA Controls

Initiate DIACAP Implementation Plan

DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 3): DIACAP/AFCAP Day2

UPDAT: 2014 – Risk Management Framework for DOD IT released.

Day 1 & 2 have been all about the very basics of DIACAP. Were introduced to the terminologies, key players of the C&A process and basically given the big picture. Like I said, GREAT for beginners, but just lots of theory and refresher if you’ve been doing C&A since DITSCAP.

Day 1 &2:

Getting the Big Picture

DIACAP/AFCAP Policy & Terminology

Roles and Responsibilities for the C&A process

Accreditation & Approval to Connect

Homework: review terminology

In between longer breaks, during lunch and just before class we sneak in episode of the The IT Crowd. Its the first time I’ve watched it so its a real treat for me. Hilarious show.

DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 2): DIACAP/AFCAP Day1

DIACAP/AFCAP Day 1.
This is the second installment of the DIACAP Essentials journal.

In the first day of class we’ve taken a high level look at the big picture of the Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification & Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and Air Force Certification & Accreditation Program (AFCAP). It is a very valuable tool for a beginner.

Since I’ve gone through the entire process (with a legacy system) more than once through all the growing pains of Air Force C&A from DITSCAP to DIACAP, I found that I knew about 90% of everything taught. I don’t mind having a refresher, though and quite frankly, I need the CPE’s for my CISSP :).

There were a couple of golden nuggets that I’ve been able to get out of some of the old timers. I learned some interesting things about how the Navy, Marines and Army do things.
Navy (as weird as their dumb ass rank system.. yep, I said it.. its dumb) have like three systems: DITPR-DON, DA-DUMB and some other BS, Marines have something called Exacta and the Army has APMS (Army Profile Management System). Also learned cool off topic stuff like history of eMass.

I must admit I’m looking forward to day two.
pros of day 1: Good solid start on basics GREAT for beginners. SecureInfo gets mad props for have a great instructor John M.(don’t know if he wants his full name published.. but he’s highly, highly knowledgeable and very positive).

cons of day 1: Right off the bat I am noticing a huge hole in the training… a lack of in depth teaching of EITDR, which is how the Air Force implements, manages and maintains the entire DIACAP/AFCAP process. I don’t really see how you can teach one without the other these days. I guess contractually, SecureInfo can not touch it since some other company has the contract. But unfortunately, the folks that are new to this are going to suffer. Because if they goto this class without knowing the EITDR they will know why but now how, and if they go to the EITDR class without knowing the DIACAP they will know how but not Why.

DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation Training (part 1)

UPDAT: 2014 – Risk Management Framework for DOD IT released.

I’ve been scheduled to go to DIACAP Essentials + IA Control Validation training. It is the same training that is given to validators at AFCA, so I guess it is pretty serious stuff. I was very reluctant to go until I realized that I actually really need the CPE’s to maintain my CISSP.

Since I’ve been doing the DIACAP stuff for about 2 years now, I’m not certain there is any new information for me to learn.

DIACAP Essentials
The Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and
Accreditation Process (DIACAP) Essentials course blends lecture and hands-on
exercises to introduce students to DIACAP policy (to include FISMA
requirements of a comprehensive, repeatable, and auditable Information
Security process).

IA Control Validation In-Depth – 3 Days
The IA Control Validation In-Depth course takes the students DIACAP
education and turns the view from an implementor to a Validator perspective
and involves the students in the validation process for the IA Controls
(DoDI 8500.2).

What I am hoping to get from the course is a better handle on the FISMA process.
I don’t feel like I really have a handle on what is supposed to happen with it.

New Certification & Accreditation Process (Rumor)

One C&A package to rule them all?

The federal government has a bunch of Certification & Accreditation processes. There is Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification & Accreditation (DIACAP) for the DOD, there’s Director of Central intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/3 for certain classified systems, there is National Information Assurance Certification & Accreditation (NIACAP) for National Security Systems. And under each of these their processes differ according the branch, leadership, organization and/or mission. Each process, organization, branch and mission has a different set of resources that they pull from. DIACAP pertains to military branches and pulls from the DoD 8500 series, many other federal agencies use National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-xx series.

Each agency, organization and/or branch uses their own methods and everyone is happy. The only problem is when a system gets exploited. When it happens there is mass panic and they realize that there are massive holes in the process.

Rumors and Trends

There have been rumors floating around about many of these federal C&A processes merging into one. At their core they are actually pretty similar. Take NIST SP 800-37, C&A of Federal Information Systems and DOD 8510, DIACAP for example. Both have an initial phase where data is gathered on the system and all parties involved with a system are pulled together (see table. 1 for more similarities).

Federal C&A Process

Phases

Activities

SP 800-37

Initiation Phase

Gather data, get agreement of all stake
holders

DIACAP

Initiate & Plan IA C&A

 

 

 

SP 800-37

Security Certification Phase

IA Control Assessment and agreement

DIACAP

Implement & Validate Assigned IA
Controls

 

 

 

SP 800-37

Security Accreditation Phase

Security implementation and assessment

 

DIACAP

Make Cert. Determination &
Accreditation Decision

 

 

 

DP 800-37

Continuous Monitoring Phase

Configuration management; FISMA reporting;
sustainment

DIACAP

Maintain Authorization to Operate

 

 

 

DIACAP

Decommission

Retire System

 

 

 

 

 

 

12-37?

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